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AFIT-ENS-MS-17-M-143
Abstract
This research develops a method to measure the cost to society of current maintenance
policy for the exchange of tritium based limited life components within nuclear weapons. The
incentives for the Department of Energy and Department of Defense which causes either a
substantial cost or substantial risk to be accepted by either Department. A simulation model is
created to measure the current policy and compare it to different policies in order to recommend
a policy that would minimize the cost to society. The measurement of the cost to society will
offer decision makers insight into the ramifications of their decisions.
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COST VERSUS RISK: THE POLICY OF NUCLEAR WEAPON MAINTENANCE
OF TRITIUM BASED LIMITED LIFE COMPONENTS
I. Introduction

Overview
In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report prepared by the Department of Defense
(DoD) and submitted to Congress, Secretary of Defense Gates, with direction from President
Obama and the Secretaries of State and Energy, pledged that “as long as nuclear weapons exist,
the United States will sustain safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces. These nuclear forces will
continue to play an essential role in deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies and
partners around the world” (Department of Defense, 2010). The DoD along with the Department
of Energy (DOE) must consider the high cost and extended timelines needed in order to sustain
the nuclear arsenal (Department of Energy, 2013). Currently, the DoD annually spends $8-9
billion on the nuclear triad, but this number does not account for the entire cost of the arsenal.
The DOE spends over $11 billion annually for weapons activities not including the cost of
follow on replacement weapon systems (Wolfsthal, Lewis, & Quint, 2014). The combined costs
to the DOE and DoD is important to investigate because while one department may fund
installation of a component, the other department could be responsible for supplying the
component. Due to the conflicting missions and objectives of each department, a dilemma may
occur. The $19 billion in weapon activities only includes direct expenditure on the sustainment
of the weapons themselves and does not encompass the full gravity of the cost placed on tax
payers of the massive Nuclear Security Enterprise that must be maintained and advanced in order
to keep up with demand.
This paper discusses the potential for the DoD, specifically the Air Force, to save limited
resources by scheduling nuclear weapons maintenance in a manner that maximizes the service
1

life of the weapons and their various components which require replacement. The Air Force may
be able to reduce the strain on the supply chain for high dollar replacement parts. This ability
could not only save the DoD and DOE money but also reduce the number of maintenance
procedures performed on a weapon, increasing the reliability of the weapon.

Background
Nuclear Stockpile
In 1992 the United States voluntarily enacted policy that prohibited underground nuclear
testing (Nikitin, 2016). The prohibition of underground testing resulted in the suspension of new
untested nuclear weapon designs (Perry, Scowcroft, & Ferguson, 2009). This new initiative
counter acted how nuclear weapons were designed from the 1960s to the 1990s. Previously,
nuclear weapons were designed to be replaced by a new design and entirely new weapon system
at the end of their life cycle (Royal, 2015). The suspension of new weapon designs led the
United States to keep current weapon designs and later would eliminate the production of new
weapons entirely. Because no new weapons were developed, current weapons are relied on for
the future of the stockpile which fosters a greater risk of an entire delivery platform being placed
offline because of a catastrophic failure of one of the weapon components. A failure in a weapon
component would ground a weapon system with no replacement being capable of being
developed or produced (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Nuclear Matters, 2016).
Nuclear weapons have been able to be maintained and certified as safe and reliable even
through the end of nuclear testing in 1992 via the Stockpile Stewardship Program. Reliability
becomes a bigger challenge the longer these weapons remain within the stockpile without
replacement. The current Stockpile Stewardship Program includes maintaining the active
stockpile, life extension programs (LEPs), and weapon dismantlement (National Nuclear
2

Security Administration, 2016). While different weapon systems are at different stages along
their life cycle within the arsenal, they all have one commonality, they must all undergo periodic
maintenance in order to stay active. While the United States’ stockpile of 4,717 warheads, as of
September 2014, is a substantial reduction from the height of the national nuclear stockpile of
31,255 weapons seen in Figure 1, the weapons that remain must be kept safe, secure, and reliable
(State Department, 2015).

Figure 1: Stockpile Quantities (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Nuclear Matters, 2016)

Nuclear weapons within the United States’ stockpile are kept in three different
configurations: active, inactive, and retired. Active weapons are kept in an operational status
with Limited Life Components (LLCs) installed and maintained on the warhead. Inactive
weapons are non-operational warheads that do not require having LLCs installed on them and the
weapons that have LLCs installed are frequently removed through attrition of the components or
dictated by policy. These active weapons are capped by the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START). This treaty restricts the U.S. and Russian nuclear forces to 1,550 operationally
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deployed strategic nuclear weapons on no more than 800 deployed intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM), sub-launch ballistic missiles (SLBM), and bombers by February 5, 2018 (U.S.
and Russian Federation, 2010). Inactive weapons are maintained and kept in a ready state
configuration which serve multiple purposes, such as logistical spares, as a hedge warhead that
can be made active within a certain prescribed timeline, or stored as inactive in case of a
technical failure in a different weapon system (Wood, 2016). Retired weapons are warheads that
are stored without LLCs installed and are awaiting dismantlement. They are kept in this stage
either awaiting to be dismantled or awaiting to be approved for disassembly, called managed
retired. All retired warheads must be maintained in a status that could allow the weapon to be
reactivated in the event of a major failure in one of the other active or inactive weapon systems
while in the custody of the DoD (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Nuclear Matters, 2016).
The difference between the two being that managed retired weapons have not been fully
approved for disassembly and a new mission or new Life Extension Program (LEP), discussed
next, could require the weapon to be brought back into the active/inactive stockpile (Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense Nuclear Matters, 2016).
The United States has not developed or produced a new nuclear weapon since 1992;
because of this, the current stockpile undergoes a LEP with the intent of updating the weapon
without producing a new nuclear package. The LEP will update components within the weapon
and prepare the weapon system for the future, but the design of the nuclear package will be
maintained, including the radioactive pit and explosives surrounding the core (Department of
Defense, 2010). The weapon system, before or after LEP, will still require periodic maintenance
to replace LLCs within the weapon.
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Limited Life Components
LLCs are items within nuclear weapons that must be replaced in accordance with a
predetermined time interval (Department of Energy, 2015). These components are used to
perform a certain function within the weapon and if the component does not perform up to a
certain level of potency or reliability the weapon will not function as designed. These time
requirements are based on the required reliability or design of the weapon system and the decay
of the component in question. LLCs can take the form of Neutron Generators, Power Supplies,
or Tritium Bottles, to name a few. This research is limited to only reviewing tritium reservoirs.
The methods and results of the research can be extended to other LLCs but further analysis and
data are required. All LLCs are exchanged prior to expiration date, unless an abnormal condition
exists, so that the weapon is always maintained in a state of readiness within the active stockpile.
Limited Life Component Exchanges (LLCEs) are conducted by Navy and Air Force Technicians
at appropriate military installations (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Nuclear Matters,
2016). The weapons are maintained according to their level of need, depending on their status of
active or inactive, and follow the schedule that is developed for each warhead by the Department
of Energy (DOE), specifically the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA) through
coordination with the appropriate military service.
An LLC has an intended function within the nuclear weapon design and it must perform
its function with a certain degree of confidence and/or potency that is well calculated. The
potency becomes an issue because most of the LLCs are designed with a radioactive element
within them. These bottles are used for boosting the weapons and have the effect of multiplying
the yield of the weapon which allows the weapon design to limit the required quantity of
fusionable material within the weapon. The ability to boost weapons was a major development
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within the U.S. nuclear stockpile and allowed the U.S. to build smaller and a greater number of
weapons (MacKenzie & Spinardi, 1995). Tritium itself is a radioactive form of hydrogen and
decays at a rate of 5.5% each year. This decay requires that the tritium within the bottles be
replenished in order to maintain a certain degree of confidence that the weapon will perform as
designed (Savannah River Site, 2011). If a tritium bottle is not exchanged by its prescribed
expiration time, the weapon would produce a yield less than its performance requirement
(Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Nuclear Matters, 2016). The same concept applies to
other LLCs, as they operate via some radioactive or explosive element that decays over time.
Although this research will focus on tritium reservoirs, the basic principles found in this research
can be applied to other LLCs. The decay rate in each LLC is known and accounted for when
calculating the life cycle of each LLC. While the specific life cycle of each component is
classified, the Nuclear Matters Handbook created by the Office of the Secretary of Defense states
“These weapons undergo regular replacement of LLCs, usually at intervals of a few years”
(Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Nuclear Matters, 2016). This research will look at a
range of years from replacement at one to five years with intervals of one year but does not
address any specific weapons system or any specific tritium reservoir.
Maintenance of Nuclear Weapons
Specific Air Force units throughout the world are certified and authorized to store and
maintain nuclear weapons. These units work closely with the NNSA to coordinate parts,
technical orders, logistics, and guidance when needed. This relationship has always been strong
out of necessity from the original declaration in the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 that nuclear
weapon development and technology will be under civilian control and not controlled by the
military (79th Congress, 1946). The civilian control has changed through time but the fact has
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remained that all nuclear weapons are owned by civilian oversight instead of military oversight
(Feaver, 1992). This control has been adopted to the present time where the ownership is held
within the NNSA and not with the military. The Air Force provides the trained personnel and
facilities for maintenance actions to take place as well as schedules alongside the NNSA to
forecast the need for the LLCs which are produced at sites controlled by the NNSA. The
Savannah River Site, for example, recycles used parts to try and salvage as much as possible for
future components. The NNSA controls the schedule of production of the Limited Life
Components but utilizes the inputs from the Air Force on when the maintenance actions could
take place.
As a weapon approaches the expiration date, the weapon will be placed on a long-range
schedule which includes a projection of maintenance dates out one fiscal year. This long-term
schedule is submitted by the unit no later than 1 February the fiscal year prior (Secretary of the
Air Force, 2015). This long-range schedule is developed by the Air Force unit who will perform
the maintenance actions taking many variables into consideration when scheduling the
maintenance action including Air Force policy on the timing of the maintenance action. This
long-range schedule is used as a forecasting tool for the DOE/NNSA to determine the demand
placed on the supply chain (Secretary of the Air Force, 2015). DOE/NNSA will alter their
production schedule of the different LLCs to best match the demand of the Air Force’s longrange schedule (Savannah River Nuclear Solutions, 2013). Once the components are produced
by DOE/NNSA the life cycle for that specific component has started and the expiration date is
known. If for example, a tritium bottle is filled in March, the timeframe for when that bottle will
expire is fixed given the tritium decay rate of 5.5% a year. The tritium bottle will now have
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some expiration date that is based on the fill date of the tritium and not based on the date of the
maintenance actions performed by the Air Force unit.
Nuclear weapon maintenance is solely based on the principle of proactive maintenance.
The LLCs within the weapon have a known rate of decay. This rate of decay is used to calculate
the time at which the component will not be able to perform to the level required. The date at
which the component must be exchanged becomes the due date. The due date is set per the
planners within the DOE/NNSA and it becomes the job of the DoD unit to forecast on the longrange schedule when the maintenance will be accomplished (Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense Nuclear Matters, 2016). Once the DoD has forecasted the maintenance, DOE/NNSA is
informed of the date with the intent to schedule the delivery of the new replacement component
(Secretary of the Air Force, 2015). Within the Air Force, the forecasted maintenance action may
not be the day of execution of the assigned task. Many variables are taken into consideration
with many variables unknown a year prior to the date of the maintenance. Maintenance
managers must be proficient enough to forecast their constraints, but actual maintenance
completion often varies from the long-range schedule.

Research Objectives, Hypotheses, & Investigative Questions
The objective of this research is to examine current long-range policy for scheduling LLC
maintenance, evaluate the cost and risk the current process invokes, and analyze the impact
potential policy changes will have toward minimizing cost and risk. As the due date for the LLC
approaches, having an accurate way to measure the risk in scheduling the exchange closer to the
due date allows maintenance managers and stockpile planners to be able to use as much of the
life of the component as possible while minimizing the risk of the component surpassing its
expiration date. By utilizing the complete life of the component, the cost of maintaining the
8

stockpile with replacement components will be reduced by reducing the frequency of
maintenance actions, the supply chain strain will be reduced, and the associated risk becomes
more predictable.

Motivation
The motivation for this research is to give maintenance managers the full picture of
implications when scheduling maintenance. If the maintenance manager does not understand the
full implications of scheduling the component early and only understands the benefits, the
maintenance actions will be scheduled at the earliest possible moment to ensure the actions are
complete. The DoD may not be incentivized, in the short term, to utilize the entire life of
components but instead have the desire to perform LLCEs well in advance of the expiration date.
Maintenance and stockpile managers should be aware of the ramifications that actions and policy
can have on the nuclear security enterprise supply chain and the potential misuse of scarce
resources.

9

II. Literature Review
Proactive Maintenance
Proactive maintenance includes two general maintenance practices, preventive and
predictive, and is covered broadly throughout academic research. Proactive maintenance is
performed when a high reliability of the system is desired and a higher availability of the
system’s function is needed. Proactive maintenance provides a higher rate of availability of the
system because as the scheduled maintenance occurs, all scheduled components are exchanged,
without failure of the component, compared to reactive maintenance which only replaces a
component upon failure. Figure 2 compares proactive to reactive maintenance (Wessels, 2003).
The reactive maintenance cycle conducts maintenance on a system once a failure occurs, only
replacing the failed item making the system available again. Every reactive maintenance action
only brings the availability of the system, plotted in Figure 2 as a dashed line, back to the
previous availability prior to component failure. This is because as a part is replaced, other
components are not replaced and their reliability is lower compared to new parts. A proactive
maintenance schedule, shown as the solid line in Figure 2, accomplishes the maintenance per a
periodic preventative schedule or based off a predictive diagnostic measurement (Ebeling, 2005).
As Figure 2 demonstrates, the availability of the system under a reactive maintenance practice
will decrease compared to that of a proactive maintenance practice for systems with increasing
failure rates.

10

Percent Available
Time
Figure 2: Proactive versus Reactive Availability (Wessels, 2003)

Proactive maintenance also has the benefit of eliminating the immediate strain placed on
supply chain and administrative actions (Wessels, 2003). In a reactive maintenance practice, the
failure of a part is not predicted nor changed periodically and the replacement part must be
ordered through supply once the failure occurs. This can create a delay in the maintenance.
Another delay of reactive maintenance is the administrative actions that need to be accomplished
prior to maintenance (Ebeling, 2005). Administrative actions can include the scheduling of
facilities, personnel, security, or purchasing capital needed to perform the maintenance. A
reactive system would have to wait until the supply and administrative actions were complete
prior to completing the maintenance. This leads to longer downtimes and reduced availability of
the system. A proactive maintenance system forecasts supply and administrative needs allowing
the components to be ordered just in time prior to maintenance. This reduces the downtime
because of the known lead time for supply. Administrative actions can be forecasted as well
which further reduces the down-time.
11

A downfall of proactive maintenance is the idea that earlier maintenance increases the
availability of the system (Ebeling, 2005). If a maintenance manager has the ultimate desire to
increase the system availability, the manager may be incentivized to schedule the maintenance
actions earlier and earlier. The earlier a component is replaced the greater the entire system’s
availability is because degraded components are renewed, assuming perfect maintenance
practices. As a system’s scheduled maintenance becomes more robust, the availability of the
system increases because fewer unexpected failures will presumably occur. This increase in
availability can lead managers to conclude that a system should be frequently maintained.
However, this is not necessarily the case because the system must usually be rendered nonoperable while the maintenance is done, which itself serves to decrease availability. If the
system was constantly in maintenance then the system could never be used and the availability of
the system would be zero. Furthermore, when something is maintained it is typically not
completely renewed because of cost and time constraints. Therefore, excessive maintenance
degrades the system at some rate (Ebeling, 2005). Planners should seek the best overall balance
between system cost, availability and scheduled maintenance actions.
Cost Based Preventative Maintenance
For a business to truly capitalize on a proactive maintenance strategy, the company must
consider cost as well as system availability when developing a schedule. The goal for
maintenance managers using Cost-Optimized Scheduled Maintenance Intervals is to realize the
benefit of replacing components before failure at an interval which maximizes the utilization of
the component within the system (Wessels, 2003). This assumes that predictive maintenance
costs are less than corrective maintenance actions. This assumption is made because under a
predictive maintenance policy, scheduled downtime is planned while unscheduled maintenance
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actions inflict variability into the system, greatly impacting unforeseen costs on the entire
system. The high cost of corrective maintenance comes from the unknown for scheduling the
maintenance. When a component fails, maintenance must respond with the actions, labor, and
parts to correct the problem (Ebeling, 2005). The time that it takes for the actions, labor, and
parts to respond to the failed component could cause delays which will extend the unscheduled
downtime even further. Also, one unknown failure within a system could cause strain on the
entire system and cause other components within the system to fail at a faster rate or put undue
strain on the system. Preventive maintenance will allow managers to be able to know when
labor and parts will be needed and to have essential items on hand at the time of the maintenance
action.
The goal of scheduling the maintenance is to minimize the strain on the entire business
because the downtime is to be expected and could be lined up with other maintenance downtimes
(Wessels, 2003). The difficulty in scheduling preventive maintenance actions this way is
knowing the true cost of the preventive maintenance versus the cost of corrective maintenance.
A business would have to measure the cost of both maintenance practices and determine which
method better utilized resources.
Just-In-Time Delivery/Toyota Production System
Just in time (JIT) delivery is a portion of the Toyota Production System (TPS) which has
been studied throughout literature. JIT delivery within TPS uses a “kaban” method where the
production system utilizes a pull system instead of a push system. The pull system takes parts
and replenishes them only when needed and only in the right amount (Liker, 2004). JIT delivery
reduces the inventory within the system and does not concentrate on the price per piece for a
machine but instead looks at the entire system and only produces a part just prior to when it is
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needed. The intent behind JIT delivery is to “supply the right materials at the right time and in
the right amount at every step in the process” (Tommelein & Li, 1999). Tommelein and Li used
JIT delivery to show different alternatives for the delivery of concrete. Concrete is a unique
product in that it is perishable with a short life cycle, has to meet customer needs, and the
delivery must be met on time for the crews to be prepared. This research looked at the vertical
supply integration alternatives that could reduce the risk incurred by late delivery of the ready to
mix concrete. A late delivery will cause the concrete to expire and the concrete may not meet
required specifications, as well as incur the high cost of the wasted time for a lay down crew
with no delivery (Tommelein & Li, 1999). This research looked at the ability for a contractor to
vertically integrate and own the delivery method from the concrete plant and compared it to the
most common method of the concrete plant delivering the product to the construction site.
Vertical integration by the contractor could provide the contractor with a known delivery time
and give more awareness of the location of the truck. The entire system, from the availability of
the ingredients to the process of mixing within the plant, is examined for the potential to become
a JIT delivery system and to use a pull system instead of a push.
In comparison to an LLC, concrete production and delivery is very similar relative to
time. Concrete is a perishable product and expires after a certain time parameter upon
production. The usability of the concrete expires at a certain known time after production and
must be utilized prior to expiration. This is similar to tritium in that after it is produced it has a
known life, but a life which is longer than ready mix concrete. The current method of production
within the Savannah River Site tritium reservoir production plant is an elongated pull system.
The system currently will not produce excess inventory and awaits the forecasted demand to be
sent by the DoD.

14

History of Weapon Maintenance Policy
Nuclear Weapon Maintenance Policy is guided by the Air Force Instruction (AFI) 21204, Nuclear Weapons Maintenance. This guidance provides procedures and guidelines that the
Air Force, at varying levels, must follow. Throughout the years this policy has adapted to an
ever-changing environment. Maintenance managers use AFI 21-204 to forecast weapon
maintenance and the demand that will be placed on DOE to support LLC replacement. Current
policy, published 17 December 2015, states that a unit will develop and submit their LLC
support forecast schedule no later than 1 February for the next Fiscal Year. As LLCs are forced
shipped to the unit, the unit may accomplish the LLCE at any time after LLC support arrives (Air
Force/A4LW, 2015). This policy is a complete reversal of how the policy was written in AFI
21-204 published 16 September 2003. In 2003, the policy stated that the LLCs would arrive
approximately 2-months prior to weapon due date (HQ USAF/ILMW, 2003). The unit was
allowed to request earlier delivery of the LLC to higher headquarters but the request could only
be based on a one-time requirement such as de-conflicting maintenance schedules, coinciding
with an inspection, or for ongoing annual projections to optimize unit maintenance scheduling
and workload leveling. A review of AFI 21-204 policy between 2003 and 2015 in Table 1 shows
the trend of a more relaxed LLC support schedule, allowing maintenance managers to adjust
LLC support and maintenance actions as needed or desired.
The current policy allows maintenance managers to adjust their schedule according to
one-time requirements, inspections, de-conflict maintenance schedules, ongoing annual
schedules, and leveling the workload while ensuring the replacement of the LLC prior to
expiration (HQ USAF/ILMW, 2003). For example, a rotary launcher within a B-52
Stratofortress can hold 8 Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM). The goal of a maintenance
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Table 1: AFI 21-204 Historical Guidance
Publication
Year
2003
2005

2007

2008

2009

2015

Shipped
Approximately 2 Months prior to Due
Date
Approximately 2 Months prior to Due
Date
Will be delivered in time to allow
maintenance actions to be accomplished
prior to due date
Will be delivered in time to allow
maintenance actions to be accomplished
prior to due date
Will be delivered in time to allow
maintenance actions to be accomplished
prior to due date
Units develop forecasted need and
delivery will be based on forecast with
time to allow for maintenance actions

Restriction
LLCE must be completed within 6
Months of due date
LLCE must be completed within 6
Months of due date
LLCE must be completed within 6
Months of due date
LLCE must be completed within 6
Months of due date
LLCE must be completed within 6
Months of due date; Complete within 60
days of LLC receipt

None

manager is to align all 8 of the ALCMs so that all their recurring maintenance actions can occur
within the same time-period (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Nuclear Matters, 2016). If
all 8 LLCEs are conducted at the same time, the handling operations of that rotary are limited.
The problem encountered when aligning all 8 weapons to expire within the same month occurs
when a single defect is found during inspection of the rotary. If a defect is found, a different
ALCM could be assigned to the rotary which will have a different maintenance cycle causing
further workload adjustments.
Current policy allows maintenance managers to determine when support is needed for the
replacement of the weapons within their purview. Figure 3 shows a blank forecast example
provided by AFI 21-204 for maintenance managers to produce the LLC support schedule for
their unit (Secretary of the Air Force, 2015). No incentive is made for maintenance managers to
consider LLC utilization when forecasting the maintenance. Instead, maintenance managers are
incentivized to perform the maintenance early in order to minimize the risk of the maintenance
16

not being completed on time. Another problem with the current policy, shown in the
examination of the data later, is the large variance in the scheduling of maintenance actions.
This occurs from the different methods that different maintenance managers use when creating
their own schedule for replacement instead of being held to a restricted timeframe.

Figure 3: Blank Template LLC Support Schedule

The example provided in Figure 3 is currently due from the units to higher headquarters
on 1 February prior to the Fiscal Year of planning. This allows Air Force and DOE planners the
time needed to properly forecast support for the production and transportation of LLCs to the
unit. Current policy also allows maintenance managers the ability to change their forecasted
long-range schedule date. This change is requested from the units no later than 90 days prior to
the month of delivery (Secretary of the Air Force, 2015).
Limited Life Components
LLC production has only become more difficult and costly for the Department of Energy
(DOE Office of Audit Services, 2003). Tritium, within the stockpile, is a perishable entity that
has a known rate of decay of a half-life of 12.3 years. The design of a nuclear weapon requires
tritium reservoirs to be exchanged at a known interval (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1997).
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These intervals vary depending on the weapon system in question and will not be shown
throughout this research. This research will use a range of life cycles from 1 to 5 years that will
be assumed for the entire stockpile, this range of years is generated from the 2016 Nuclear
Matters Handbook which states “These weapons undergo regular replacement of LLCs, usually
at intervals of a few years” (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Nuclear Matters, 2016).
These maintenance actions ensure that the weapon and associated components will perform to
the design specifications of the system if employed.
Currently, Savannah River Site is prepared to meet tritium demands by first recycling
tritium from the stockpile as much as possible and in the production of tritium through the
Tennessee Valley Authority (Office of Chief Financial Officer, 2016). The recycling of tritium
is done by taking the tritium reservoirs that have been removed from active weapons and
retrieving as much of the tritium as possible from the reservoir. This method has enabled the
tritium stockpile to be replenished and not need as much production (Savannah River Nuclear
Solutions, 2013). The current inventory of tritium has allowed the production of new tritium to
remain low. However, to meet future demand, production rates of tritium must increase
(Department of Energy, 2015). The current method that has been in place since 2003 to produce
tritium is through the irradiation of tritium-producing burnable absorber rods (TPBARs).
TPBARs are irradiated within the reactor located at the Tennessee Valley Authority (D'Agostino,
2011). Once irradiated, the bars are transferred to the Savannah River Site extraction facility
where the tritium is captured and the TPBARs are then disposed of as low-level radioactive
waste (Department of Energy, 2015). The captured tritium gas is piped to the Savannah River
Site Tritium Loading and Unloading Facility where the tritium is stored in the national tritium
stockpile, purified, and loaded into limited-life tritium reservoirs (Savannah River Nuclear
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Solutions, 2013). The major factors that are incorporated into the demand of tritium stem from
weapon LLCE, tritium required for LEPs, and the production efficiency of the TPBARs
(Department of Energy, 2015). In order to meet the tritium demand from the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review, the demand in FY14 was 704 TPBARs and is projected to increase to 2,704
TPABARs by FY23. This increase in demand for TPBARs causes the demand for unobligated
low-enriched uranium. NNSA uses the unobligated low-enriched uranium for national defense
purposes but currently there is no supply of the uranium because of the shutdown of the Paducah
Gaseous Diffusion Plant in 2013 (Department of Energy, 2017). While plans are underway
within DOE to try and find alternative methods of supplying low-enriched uranium, this
demonstrates that the current price for tritium of $100,000 to $200,000 can only be expected to
increase, emphasizing the value of tritium within the national security complex (Willms, 2003).
The current process for replacement of the LLCs results in a Prisoner’s Dilemma between
the DOE and DoD. A Prisoner’s Dilemma is when two players have two options in which the
outcomes are based on the simultaneous choices of each respective player. This dilemma is
illustrated by the example of two prisoners being questioned by the police in which their
respective sentence will be reduced if that prisoner talks to the police, but if both prisoners talk
then their sentences will both be vastly longer (Cachon & Netessine, 2003). The DoD is
incentivized to exchange the components early to minimize the risk of the weapon going overdue
prior to LLCE and therefore being considered non-operational. The DOE is likewise
incentivized to use up the entire life of the component because of the high cost of the tritium
within a tritium reservoir. Within Game Theory, this results in the Prisoner’s Dilemma along the
supply chain as represented in Table 2 (Cachon & Netessine, 2003). Both the DOE and the DoD
have two options when it comes to LLCs. DOE can cooperate with the DoD and produce them
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according to the long-range schedule, resulting in a lower utilization rate, or the DOE can
produce the tritium reservoirs according to the expiration of the components, resulting in a
higher utilization rate and a lower cost. The DoD has similar options in regards to scheduling the
components for replacement. They can cooperate and schedule the components close to the due
date, increasing the risk of not exchanging the components prior to due date, or the DoD can
schedule maintenance actions early to reduce the risk. Currently, the DoD is not incentivized to
cooperate because the funds that ultimately pay for the tritium production and supply comes
from the DOE and the DOE is not incentivized to schedule the components early because the risk
is placed on the DoD. The ultimate consumer, the tax payer, has a buy in for both systems to
work together to reach the goal of a medium risk for the weapon and a medium utilization rate.

Table 2: DoD vs DOE Prisoner’s Dilemma
DOE
DOE, DOD
Cooperate
Cheat
Cooperate Med Utilization, Med Risk High Utilization, High Risk
DoD
Cheat Low Utilization, Low Risk Low Utilization, High Risk
This research seeks to quantify the fundamental trade off experienced between the risk
associated with scheduling the maintenance actions at different time intervals compared to the
utilization of the component’s life cycle which is the cost variable.
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III. Methodology

Overview
This research uses current policy to produce a simulation model which compares the
current system against potential policy changes to try and find a method that satisfies the DoD
and DOE desires of on time maintenance and component utilization. Keloton, Sadowski and
Zupick developed a generic outline to follow when building a simulation in their book
Simulation with Arena (Kelton, Sadowski, & Zupick, 2009). The steps in the outline are:
1. Formulate the problem
2. Design a solution methodology
3. Specify the system and subsystems
4. Construct a model
5. Verify and Validate the model
6. Design and conduct experiments
7. Present and preserve the results
The Methodology chapter of this research covers steps one through five while the Analysis and
Results chapter will cover steps six and seven.

Formulate the Problem
The problem in this research is to define and measure the success of the current system of
forecasting and performing maintenance actions on nuclear weapons. Success in this research is
defined as minimizing the risk, where risk is defined as the number of times maintenance is
performed after the due date of the component, and to maximize the utilization of the
component. Current policy in the Air Force allows maintenance managers to forecast
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maintenance actions and demand of LLCs based on their own objectives outlines in Air Force
Policy (Secretary of the Air Force, 2015). If the Air Force accomplishes the maintenance actions
further from the due date, the cost to the tax payer will increase because the amount of resources
needed increases. This research then tries to measure different policies that would result in
varying rates of risk and utilization.

Design a Solution
The solution to the problem was developed by observing the current design of the system
using Air Force Instructions. The desired solution is to replicate the current methods used in the
system to find the risk and utilization and then to change specific parameters within the
simulation to try and find a method that will better suit a cooperative solution for both the DOE
and DoD. The simulation is built using ARENA 14.0, designed by Rockwell, because of the
ease of use when replicating the process.

Specify the System
The system was replicated using AFI 21-204 and the description of the methods by Air
Force unit personnel to outline certain requirements of the unit and to outline the timeline that
occurs when forecasting an LLCE (Secretary of the Air Force, 2015). Figure 4 shows the current
system and a brief description of each step in the process. The measure of performance (MOP)
used for measuring utilization are:
-

Difference between the time of LLC production and installation

-

Difference between the time the LLC is uninstalled and the due date of the LLC

The MOPs measuring the risk of not exchanging the LLC prior to due date are:
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-

The number of times maintenance is performed past due date divided by the total number
of weapons maintained

The system is divided into two parts, the Air Force side which focuses on scheduling and
accomplishing the maintenance actions on time, and the DOE side which focuses on producing
and delivering the LLC according to the long-range forecast. The forecast is determined from
the current policy and is created by the Air Force.

Tritium Reservoir Sequence of Event
Air Force
Awaits Maintenance
Date: Administrative
Actions
Active Weapon awaits
placement on the Long‐
Range Schedule

Unit Creates Long‐
Range Schedule: AFI 21‐
204 (Risk, Conveince,
Aavailability)

Creates Short‐Range
Schedule

Department of Energy

Maintenance is
performed according to
Short Range Schedule
(MSE).

Weapon is now Active
with new bottle

Delivers Tritium bottles
prior to L.R. Scehdule.
Typically delivers 30
days prior to forecast.

Fills Tritium bottles to
meet L.R. Forecast.
Bottle's due date
assigned once filled.

Weapon is Active

Figure 4: Tritium Reservoir Sequence of Events
While Figure 4 looks at the entire system, further analysis was desired on a single
component itself to show the life of a single tritium bottle. Using Figure 5, once a bottle is
produced by DOE/Savannah River Site its expiration date is set. Anytime in-between the bottle
being produced and the bottle not being installed in a weapon is unutilized time. Anytime that a
bottle is removed prior to the expiration date is also unutilized time. The system must be able to
record the two times to be able to determine the final utilization rate of the tritium bottle.
Conversely, every circumstance that a tritium bottle is not replaced prior to its expiration
date is a failure of the system. This measured by using a percentage of number failed over total
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number maintained. The model must be able to determine whether the maintenance actions were
performed prior to the due date.
Bottle
Produced
• Expiration Date
Set

Delivery by
OST

Maintenance
Actions

Active
Weapon

• Install Bottle

Maintenance
Actions
• Remove Bottle

Due Date of
Bottle

Figure 5: Tritium Reservoir Life Cycle
Construct a Model
Utilizing Figure 4, the researcher created the model in ARENA 14.0 to replicate the
system. The model represents each step in the process of creating a long-range schedule,
production of an LLC based on the long-range schedule, delivery of the LLC based on the longrange schedule, and the maintenance effectiveness of executing according to the long-range
schedule. Long-range schedules, due dates, and dates of the maintenance actions were recorded
from two different maintenance units (any sensitive information was removed prior to
examination by the researcher). The data were populated into two different data sets.
The first data set is used to examine the difference between the due date of the LLC and
the date that was scheduled on the long-range schedule. This data set is used to replicate the
current process of LLCE scheduling and to set the LLC production dates. These data represent
the number of days early that the maintenance actions were scheduled on the long-range
schedule, shown in the histogram in Figure 6. These data are used to create the long-range
schedule which DOE uses to schedule the production and delivery of LLCs to the unit.
For these data, the limitation is the lack of information from multiple sources. These data
are used as a validation method of the model in order to show that the model is accurately
predicting the current system. These data are based on the current Air Force policy of allowing
maintenance managers at the unit to forecast the dates of maintenance actions and allows the
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maintenance manager to cause a large variance in scheduling procedures. These data was then
modeled using Input Analyzer, a function within ARENA 14.0, to find the best fit distribution of
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0
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15
26
37
48
59
70
81
92
103
114
125
136
147
158
169+

Frequency

the data.

Number of Days Scheduled Early

Figure 6: Due vs Scheduled

Utilizing Input Analyzer from ARENA 14.0, the best fit distribution is found to be a
Weibull distribution seen in Figure 7. In testing the Weibull distribution, the Chi Square Test
results in a failure and a rejection of the null hypothesis that the distribution fits the data, this
could be the result of having a large sample size of 255 observations. Although the test rejects
the null hypothesis of fitting a Weibull distribution, the researcher decided that the Weibull
distribution was the best fit because of the characteristics of the distribution. The Weibull
distribution is bounded on the left by zero which aligns with the fact that a rational maintenance
manager would not schedule the maintenance actions on the long-range schedule after the due
date of the LLC. Another characteristic that is desired is the right-hand tail of the Weibull
distribution. The largest value found from observation of the data was 169 days prior to LLC
due date but, according to Air Force Instruction, this is not the maximum number of days early
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the maintenance actions could be scheduled. According to current Air Force Instruction the
actions could be scheduled earlier but the likelihood of an early schedule date in comparison to
the due date approaches zero if the maintenance manager is planning rationally. The final
characteristic that is desired of the Weibull distribution is the high peak, while the observed data
has a higher peak than is represented in the Weibull distribution, the accuracy of the distribution
increases quickly as seen in Table 3.

Figure 7: Due vs Scheduled Distribution

Table 3: Accuracy of Weibull Distribution
Days Observed Weibull Difference
26
10.70%
14.20%
‐3.50%
48
40.74%
41.93%
‐1.19%
70
77.37%
69.43%
7.94%
92
89.30%
87.56%
1.74%
114
93.83%
96.11%
‐2.28%
125
97.53%
98.03%
‐0.50%

The second data set examines the difference between the long range schedule date and
the date of execution of the maintenance actions. This data set is used to show how effective the
Air Force unit is at executing the long-range schedule and will be called the long-range
maintenance effectiveness. Histograms were created for both Base 1’s and Base 2’s long-range
scheduling effectiveness is shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9 respectively. From observation of the
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histograms, the researcher decided that the best fit distribution is a Laplace distribution. The
researcher chose this distribution because of the extremely high peak centered on the median of
both data sets. The Laplace distribution represents two exponential distributions back to back
and allows negative values which is why the exponential distribution could not be used.

Frequency
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-35
-27
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-11
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5
13
21
28
36
44
52
60
68
76
84+

0
Long-Range Scheduling Effectiveness (Days)
Figure 8: Base 1 Maintenance Scheduling Effectiveness

50
Frequency

40
30
20
10
0
-21 -11 0 11 21 32 42 53 64+
Long-Range Scheduling Effectiveness (Days)
Figure 9: Base 2 Long-Range Scheduling Effectiveness
The Laplace distribution uses a parameter estimation, Error! Reference source not
found., which finds the parameter which will best fit the data.
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∑

Where

|

̂|

(1)

is the parameter estimate
i=1 to n is the index number of the value within the N observations
is the value within the data set on the ith observation
̂ is the median value within the data set

Using the Laplace parameter estimation method from the book The Laplace Distribution
and Generalizations by Kotz, Kozubowski, and Podgorski, the researcher found that the
parameter estimator for Base 1 and Base 2, seen in Table 4, only vary slightly but both
parameters were used in the validation method of the model which is discussed in the Verify and
Validate the Model section to follow (Kotz, Kozubowski, & Pogorski, 2001).
Table 4: Laplace Parameter Estimation
Parameter Estimation
Base 1
Base 2
N
255
64
µ hat
0
0
b hat
7.0235
7.25

The result from the parameter estimators produces the ability to determine the Laplace
distribution for each Base. These Laplace distributions are compared to the histograms of Base 1
and Base 2 in Figure 10 and Figure 11 respectively.
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Figure 10: Base 1 Laplace
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Figure 11: Base 2 Laplace

The researcher decided that since the distributions are so similar (see Figure 12 and
Figure 13 for comparison and difference between the data respectively), that the results from
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Base 1 would be used because of the completeness of the data observed from Base 1 with the
inclusion of the due date of the components. The assumption is made throughout the
experiments that the effectiveness of the unit to complete maintenance according to the
scheduled date on the long-range will not change.
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0.04

0
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0
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0.02

Base 1 f(x)

Base 2 f(x)

Figure 12: Laplace Distribution Comparison: Base 1 vs Base 2
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Figure 13: Laplace Distribution Difference

The researcher then ensured that no other sources of variance could be found within the
current system and found that one source of variability was left within the system, the delivery of
the components by DOE/OST. The researcher then sought clarification from subject matter
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experts to find if data were available to find the distribution and accuracy of delivery. Data were
not available, but the subject matter experts provided minimum, most likely, and maximum
quantities of 15, 30, and 60 days respectively (Lueck, 2016). The researcher decided to use a
Triangular distribution to set the delivery time proceeding the production of the LLC. The
researcher also used an adjustable decision variable to determine if the delivery was achieved or
not. Subject matter experts explained that if a delivery was delayed, typically it would be
delayed by at most seven days. The researcher decided to use this information to further test the
sensitivity of the model which is discussed in the next section.
The next step was for the researcher to determine the simulation’s time interval. The
actual timelines for the life span of an LLC are classified and the time period is not significant
for the model. Instead, the model investigates the number of maintenance cycles a weapon will
experience over a fixed time horizon. The researcher decided that five life cycles will provide
enough information to determine the validity of the model and that the number of entities that
will enter the system will be the total number of weapons obligated by the New START treaty,
1,550 weapons. This will provide the data needed to show the varying levels of risk and
utilization per cycle and can then be applied to certain time parameters that will be assumed and
examined later in the research.
The final step was to determine the number of replications needed in order to find a
confidence interval of 95%. The current design of the system has no queuing within the model
which creates a simulation with entities that have independence from one another. The
independence of the entities enables each entity’s experience to be a single replication. The
single replication of the model per entity results in a total number of 1,550 replications.
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Verify and Validate the Model
Verification of the model was conducted by the researcher within ARENA 14.0 by using
the step by step animation tool. This was conducted with only one entity in the system up to the
full entity compliment of 1,550 at varying intervals. The animation process in ARENA showed
that the model was running as desired. Different parameters within the model were changed to
see if the model would respond as necessary and the model ran as predicted.
The first validation method used was to run the model and compare to the observed data.
The first comparison was to compare the values assigned by the distributions with the actual
data. Figure 14 shows the comparison of the observed data from Base 1 and the Weibull
distribution which represents the number of days early the unit will schedule the weapon for an
LLCE operation prior to due date.
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Figure 14: Base 1 Observed vs Weibull

The next validation conducted examined the long-range scheduling effectiveness and
compared the observed data from the model and the actual data from Base 1 and Base 2, seen in
Figure 15 and Figure 16 respectively.
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Figure 15: Base 1 Observed vs Laplace
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Figure 16: Base 2 Observed vs Laplace

While all three of the distributions are not perfect, it can be seen that the error observed
favors the unit’s effectiveness to execute the maintenance according to the long-range schedule.
This means that the model will more often show the unit as scheduling the maintenance action
closer to the due date as well as effectively executing the long-range date more often. The error
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that is caused in this will result in a higher utilization than what may actually be occurring in the
field. The researcher decided that this error is acceptable because it favors the unit’s utilization
compared to the minimization of risk.
The next validation completed by the researcher was the comparison of Base 1 to Base 2
found in Table 5 with the different Laplace distributions assigned to each Base. The assumption
was made that Base 2 would have nearly identical data and that the Weibull distribution would
still be a best fit distribution when examining Base 2. This assumption resulted in the product of
the comparison to truly be examining the difference in the Laplace parameter estimation and the
effect they will have on the model. The comparison of Base 1 and Base 2 shows little difference
between the two Laplace parameter estimations. The researcher decided because the difference
was so small, the complete data of Base 1 would be used in the experiments.
Table 5: Base Comparison

Avg Days
St Dev
% Late
# Late
# On Time
Total

Base Comparison
Base 1 Base 2 Difference
92.13
92.01
0.12
31.12
31.18
-0.06
0.82%
0.86%
-0.04%
76.50
80.50
-4.00
9303.50 9303.00
0.50
9380.00 9383.50
-3.50

The final validation step conducted by the researcher is to compare the actual results
observed from the unit in comparison with the model seen in Table 6. The comparison shows
that each area of measurement within the model represents the actual data with minimal
difference or with a slight difference that will ultimately skew the results in the favor of a higher
utilization and lower risk. This is because the model will, on average, show that the unit
schedules the maintenance actions closer to the due date while also executing the maintenance
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actions closer to the long-range schedule date. This will result in the model portraying the unit
as replacing the LLC’s at a closer date to the due date more efficiently resulting in a higher
utilization rate with nearly the same percent of weapons being completed past the due date as the
actual observed data.
Table 6: Model vs Observed
Model vs Actual
Base 1 Observed
Model
Average Days Early
53.43
56.53
Standard Deviation
30.27
29.53
Average Percent Late
0.8155%
0.8163%
Standard Deviation
0.025%
Completion vs Scheduled
-0.05
4.09
Standard Deviation
9.89
15.10
Due vs Scheduled
57.17
57.10
Standard Deviation
30.01
28.97
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Difference
3.10
-0.74
0.0008%
4.14
5.21
-0.07
-1.04

IV. Analysis and Results
Design and Conduct Experiments
The experiments were designed around the principal objective of the research which is to
determine if there exists a policy that satisfies both DOE and DoD in their desired objectives.
The experiments were therefore designed to examine the rate of utilization of the LLC, the
number of wasted days, and the number of weapon maintenance actions that occurred past the
due date of the weapon. Throughout the experiments the assumption was made to use an
exchange time period of 365 days as a base case but later the examination is made into what the
utilization rate and risk percentage would be if the life span of the LLC varied from one year to
five years days at intervals of one year. The different experiments conducted to compare with
the current system are:


Alter the Long Range Schedule Policy



Alter the Delivery Accuracy



Alter the Deliver Time



Implement a Rational Long Range Scheduling Policy

Present and Preserve the Results
Long Range Schedule Policy
The first designed experiment is to alter the time to which a unit could schedule the
maintenance actions on the long range schedule. The researcher first picked 60 days prior to
LLC expiration as a starting point because current procedures result in an average of 57.09 days
and the comparison wanted to be looked at to see if the variance in scheduling procedures
resulted in the low utilization. The researcher chose to use intervals of five days and to then fine
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tune the amount of days to be able to show the different capabilities of the unit if policy dictated
an exact timeframe on when to schedule the maintenance action. The results from this
experiment, presented in Figure 17, show that the difference between scheduling the
maintenance actions at 60 days prior to due date compared to 30 days results in a higher
utilization of the LLC. Conversely, the risk percentage between the 60 and 30 day policies
increases. The significant determination in this comparison though is when compared to the
current system, a policy of constantly scheduling the maintenance actions 60 days prior to due
date will attain a percentage of overdue weapons as nearly zero while also obtaining the same
utilization, shown as the number of days unused of the LLC. The change in policy from the
current system to a 30 day policy would result in nearly a month savings in the utilization while
also achieving a reduction in percentage of failure to complete the maintenance compared with
the current system. The percentage of failure to complete the maintenance can be attributed to
the current system having an average of 57.09 days with a standard deviation of 30.27 days.
This experiment also resulted in finding that as the policy of long range scheduling approaches
zero, the risk of not performing the maintenance on time increases to beyond that of the current
system and this risk may not be acceptable to the DoD nor will it incentivize DoD units to adopt
such a policy. This experiment resulted in the researcher using the 30 day policy as a
comparison point for the later experiments.
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Figure 17: Alter Long Range Schedule Policy

Delivery Accuracy
The next experiment that was conducted was to alter the accuracy of the delivery. This
could be caused by weather or an aircraft breakdown prior to delivery and would result in the
delivery being delayed 7 days. The delay is assumed to be a constant delay. This experiment is
designed to determine the current system’s and 30 day policy model’s sensitivity to a delay in the
delivery of an LLC. The results of the experiment shown in Figure 18 show that the model acts
as predicted and that the percentage of weapons that are completed past the due date increase
slightly and that the total number of unused days remain constant. The number of unused days
remaining constant can be explained by the limited number of LLCs that are actually delayed
would not have a significant impact on the average number of days unused for each LLC because
delivery is scheduled with a buffer assigned by a Triangular distribution discussed previously
with 15, 30, and 60 days being the respective minimum, most likely, and maximum values. This
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also shows that current policy could have significant impact if the supply chain of LLCs is
interrupted by any significant delay. The 30 day policy would also be impacted by any
significant impact in the supply chain but the risk would be maintained below what the current
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Figure 18: Delivery Accuracy
Delivery Time
The delivery time experiment was conducted to test the sensitivity of the current system
and the 30 day policy system against the fluctuation of the delivery time frame. The current
delivery time frame assumes a Triangular distribution with a minimum, most likely, and
maximum of 15, 30, and 60 days respectively. The experiment changed the minimum and
maximum values at intervals of 7.5 days for the minimum and 15 days for the maximum. The
results of the experiment are shown in Figure 19. The results show that as the delivery time is
fine-tuned and approach a constant value, the percent of weapons that are late increase. This
experiment resulted in showing that the model is sensitive to changes in the delivery time, but in
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a manner that is counter intuitive. When only considering the 30 day policy, the percent of late
weapons increases as the delivery date approaches the constant value of 30 days. This is because
the 30 day policy sets a standard that the maintenance actions will be conducted 30 days prior to
weapon due date and as the delivery approaches the 30 days prior to the scheduled date, the
percent late would become a constant with no variance beyond that of the long-range
maintenance scheduling effectiveness (the Laplace distribution). In comparison the current
policy does show a trend in its sensitivity to the delivery time being adjusted. This could be the
result of the variance being impacted by both the long-range maintenance scheduling
effectiveness (Laplace distribution) and the long-range scheduling policy that is currently being
conducted by Air Force units (the Weibull distribution) and further research would be needed to
determine this finding. The results of this experiment show that with a constant policy of
maintenance actions being scheduled 30 days prior to weapon due date, the sensitivity to the
change in delivery will not significantly impact the percentage of weapons that go overdue prior
to maintenance actions. This experiment also shows that as the delivery time becomes constant,
the total number of unused days remaining on the LLC decrease.
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Figure 19: Delivery Time
Potential Policy
The final experiment was designed to try and find a maintenance policy that is rational to
both reduce the number of unused days and reduce the risk to the Air Force of conducting
maintenance operations past the due date of an LLC. The researcher decided to try two different
distributions because no data were available to show how a unit would respond to such a change
in policy. The variable that is changed is the long-range schedule date in comparison to the due
date. This variable is changed into two different distributions that potentially could represent the
actual data if such a policy change was made. The two different distributions that are used are
the Triangular and Uniform distributions. The researcher tried to set time frames that would be
rational to Air Force units and allow Air Force units to adjust their long-range schedule in order
to line-up other maintenance actions, personnel availability, load leveling, and any reason the
maintenance unit could decide that the scheduled date of maintenance action should be changed
within a reasonable timeframe and in accordance with the policy.
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The two different distributions were assigned different time periods to allow the decision
to be made of what would be the best fit for maintenance organizations. The potential policy
changes are compared to the current system as well as the 30 day policy. The three different
policy changes that were tested are:


Unit must schedule the LLCE between 30 and 60 days from LLC due date



Unit must schedule the LLCE between 30 and 51 days from LLC due date



Unit must schedule the LLCE between 23 and 51 days from LLC due date

The results of this experiment in Figure 20 show that changing the policy to a restriction of
30 to 60 days will result in the most drastic reduction in the percent of maintenance actions that
are completed after the due date while also potentially reducing the number of unused days
remaining in an LLC. Figure 20 compares the current policy and the 30 day strict policy to that
of the potential policies. The comparison is made for each policy with the respective distribution
that is assumed the maintenance unit will follow, either a Uniform or Triangular Distribution.

Potential Policy
100.00

Control

30 Day

UNIF(30,60)

30 to 60 Day
30 to 51 Day
23 to 51 Day
Policy
UNIF(23,51)
Policy
UNIF(30,51)
Policy

1.00%

80.00

0.80%

60.00

0.60%

40.00

0.40%

20.00

0.20%

0.00

0.00%
Control

30 to 60 Day Policy

30 to 51 Day Policy

23 to 51 Day Policy

Figure 20: Potential Policy Comparison
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% Late

Comparison of Potential Policies
Using the results from the comparison of potential policies, the next comparison
examined the potential cost savings from adjusting the policy. This calculation was formulated
by taking the average number of components used throughout the replication of the model.
These costs would include the cost of replacing all 1,550 weapons authorized in accordance with
New START and the assumption that the cost of one LLC was only the low estimate for the cost
of a single gram of tritium. The assumption was made for this calculation that each LLC only
costs $100,000. This is made because the true cost for an LLC is unknown but the lower
threshold for a single gram of tritium is used to show the potential cost if the assumption is made
that each LLC required one gram. The results of this cost calculation are then divided by the
assumed replacement time frame. Since the actual time frame of specific LLC’s within specific
weapon systems is classified, the researcher decided to apply a simple range from one to five
years for replacement life cycle of the entire stockpile at an interval of one year. These data
result in the assumed cost if the entire stockpile’s LLCs had to be exchanged at the specific time
parameter. The results in Figure 21 show that the cost associated with exchanging the LLCs is
reduced by the factor of the time parameter in comparison to the single year replacement. In
order to justify the policy the average of each model with the different Triangular and Uniform
distributions was taken. This was done to allow for variance in scheduling practices
accomplished by maintenance units while following the specified policy.
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Figure 21: Cost of Replacement

While the cost associated with the change in policy is something of great interest to the
DOE, the DoD would not be incentivized to change the policy because of the associated risk.
While Figure 20 shows the reduction in risk according to the specified distribution selected
according to the change in policy, the researcher decided a single value would be beneficial to
try and minimize both the cost and the risk. The Prisoner’s Dilemma exists between the two
organizations when only looking at the interests of each organization but an observer takes a step
back to find who the ultimate consumer is an alignment of interest begins to present itself. The
ultimate consumer in this scenario is National Security and the society within the United States.
This research assumes that society as a whole desires the risk of completing maintenance actions
past due date to be minimized at the lowest possible cost to the DOE. This assumption is made
because society has a cost associated with weapons not being on an operational status because of
a failure to complete maintenance. Society also has a cost associated with the expenditure of
valuable resources.
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The following calculation was used to find the cost to society, assuming risk and cost are
equally important:
minimize

∗

∀

(2)

where: mi is the cost to society for implementing policy i from among n choices.
is the average cost in dollars of the ith policy.
is the average risk of the ith policy, expressed as a number bounded by [0, 1].
The objective of Equation 2 is to find the lowest cost-risk policy. The result is the optimal policy
that would allow maintenance managers the needed flexibility to schedule maintenance actions
according to their own needs while also minimizing tritium bottle replacement cost and risk.
Figure 22 shows the m calculation for five candidate policies assuming 5 different replacement
cycles. This shows that the optimal policy schedules the maintenance on the long range from 30
to 60 days prior to due date.

Cost to Society

10000000
8000000
6000000
4000000
2000000
0

Current

1 Year Replacement 2 Year Replacement 3 Year Replacement 4 Year Replacement 5 Year Replacement
Cycle
Cylce
Cylce
Cylce
Cylce

30

30 to 60 Day Policy

30 to 51 Day Policy

Figure 22: m Calculation
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23 to 51 Day Policy

V. Conclusion and Recommendation
Recommendations for Action
Further analysis into the maintenance policy and practice should be conducted to better
understand whether current policy should be sustained. This research looked at information from
two locations but only received complete data from one location, this is a limitation in the
research and further action could be conducted to validate the trend throughout all units. An
examination of the effects from previous policy may also influence the rationale for the current
policy. In 2003, the two month policy was in place and researching LLCEs during this time
period may offer further explanation into the secondary effects of the policy.
The adjustment of policy may not be beneficial to the DOE if they cannot readily adjust
the production schedule to match the forecast. This research assumed that DOE has an
immediate production capability to perfectly match the demand placed on the system. Further
analysis into the DOE’s production capabilities will show the true potential for savings within
the supply chain. DOE’s production facility may not be able to produce components on a month
to month basis and instead may have to produce components at an all or nothing method.
Limitations that were experienced within this research was the classification of true
source data. The true source documents and time parameters for specific weapon systems and
weapon components are classified and this research remained unclassified. Assumptions had to
be made and the date ranges used could skew the actual cost savings or reduction of risk.
Another assumption made was the quantity of weapons examined within the system of 1,550
includes all Air Force and Navy nuclear weapon systems while the data sources for the Bases
only came from Air Force units. Further research could look at the ability of the Air Force and
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Navy to adopt the same policies in order to minimize the variance experienced by the entire
system.
Current developments being made within LLCs and tritium reservoirs may cause this
research to be invalidated. The DOE is currently researching the capability to extend the life of
components by changing the design of the system. This new design could allow the service life
of the component to go beyond a point where the risk and cost savings could be arbitrary
compared to the entire system.
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Appendix: Summary Slide
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